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TORTS: RAILROAD COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Georgia,So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Southeast
Georgia,Inc., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965)
Plaintiff railroad brought suit for property damages sustained in
a grade crossing collision with defendant's truck. Defendant bottling
company counterclaimed for damages to its property. Each party asserted the defense of contributory negligence as a bar to the other's
claim, but the trial court on the basis of Florida's "comparative
negligence" statute' struck the railroad's defense. This statute applies only to actions against railroads and provides that when both
parties are at fault the railroad is liable for damages, but that the
damages shall be reduced in proportion to the fault of the other
party. The jury returned a verdict denying the railroad's claim and
awarding the bottling company 50 per cent of its stipulated damages.
By awarding one-half of the damages the jury necessarily found the
parties were equally at fault. The negligence of the railway barred its
recovery, but the bottling company's negligence operated only to
reduce its recovery by one-half under the railroad comparative negligence statute. On direct appeal the Florida Supreme Court HELD,
the statute unconstitutional as a denial of due process and equal
protection of the law.2 Judgment reversed and remanded.
The comparative negligence statute was first enacted in 18873 and
was apparently a legislative response to the condemnation by the
Florida Supreme Court of the doctrine of contributory negligence in
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra.4 Subsequent court decisions
applying the statute were primarily interpretative, and its constitutionality was not squarely challenged until 1942 in Loftin v. Crowley's,

I. FLA. STAT. §768.06 (1963). No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to himself or his property, where the same is done by
his consent, or is caused by his own negligence. If the plaintiff and the agents of
the company are both at fault, the former may recover, but the amount of recovery shall be such a proportion of the entire damages sustained, as the defendant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and
the defendant.
2.

U.S. CONsT., amend. XIV, §1;

FLA. CONsT.

Decl. of Rights §12.

3. Fla. Laws 1877, ch. 3744, §§1,2.
4. 21 Fla. 700, 738 (1886). The court calls for legislative enactment of a comparative negligence statute similar to the admiralty rule. For a thorough discussion of the history of this statute and of comparative negligence in general
see Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958).
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Inc.5 In that case the Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute, declaring the classification to be a reasonable one.
The present decision is based upon the theory that the comparative negligence statute, although valid when enacted, has now become
an arbitrary and discriminatory burden on railroads. The principle
that a statute might be reasonable when enacted but may become unreasonable due to changing conditions was recognized in Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. IVey,6 when the Florida Supreme Court struck
down acts7 requiring the fencing of railroad rights-of-way and authorizing double damages for livestock killed on unfenced rights-of-way.
In declaring this treatment of railroads to be arbitrary and unreasonable, the court equated the duty owed the public by a train running
on tracks with that of an automobile running on the highway and
concluded that if motorists were not required to fence the highways,
railroads should not be required to fence their tracks. The legislative determination of the danger to the public from the operation
of railroads was apparently the reason that railroads were singled out
by the comparative negligence statute.8 The statute was enacted before the advent of the automobile, when railroads were unquestionably in a class by themselves with respect to danger to the public,
but in this decision the court has recognized the tremendous increase
in traffic and accidents on our highways and the corresponding decline
in railroad traffic and accidents. The legal status of the automobile as
a dangerous instrumentality has been firmly established by the Florida
courts. 9

This decision will have far-reaching effects on the negligence law
of Florida. At the least it represents a substantial change in the law
of railroad accidents, and at most it could provide the impetus for
legislative enactment of a general comparative negligence law. A
system of comparative negligence in abrogation of the frequently
unjust common law rule of contributory negligence has long been
urged by commentators and jurists. 1° The railroad comparative negligence statute, however, has been the limit of the application of the
5. 150 Fla. 836, 8 So. 2d 909 (1942).
6. 148 Fla. 680, 5 So. 2d 244 (1941).
7. Fla. Laws 1927, ch. 3, §§6669, 6670, 6671, 6672, 6673, 6676.
8. Grace v. Geneva Lumber Co., 71 Fla. 32, 70 So. 774 (1916).
9. MacCurdy v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Fla. 1956); Barth v.
City of Miami, 146 Fla. 542, 1 So. 2d 574 (1941); City of Tampa v. Easton, 145
Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940); State v. Quigg, 143 Fla. 227, 196 So. 417 (1940);
Cranshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27, 194 So. 353 (1940); Southern
Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
10. See, e.g., James, Comparative Negligence, 26 UTAH BAR BuLL. 109 (1956),
Maloney, supra note 4, at 173; Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J.
195 (1954); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH L. Rav. 465 (1953).
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doctrine in Florida, and the courts have correctly refused to extend
this statute beyond its plain language. I" In 1943, the legislature passed
a general comparative negligence act, but it was vetoed by the
Governor. 12 Apparently the major objection to that act was that it
would have allowed a plaintiff to recover regardless of the relative
degree of his fault, hence a plaintiff almost entirely responsible for
an accident would still have been allowed to recover a portion of his
damages. 1"
The situation created by the present case will be difficult if not
impossible for the legislature to ignore completely, and there are
several legislative alternatives available. The first and most obvious
alternative is to do nothing, but even inaction will result in a substantial change in the law of negligence as applied in the courts of
Florida for the last eighty-eight years. The strong influences of those
who are frequently defendants coupled with the general inertia of
the legislature and the confusion in the wake of legislative reapportionment makes this course of inaction highly probable. The legislature may also choose to draft a narrow act merely curing the defects pointed out by the court. A law applying to all common carriers
would probably meet the test of constitutionality. The legislature
could return the initiative to the courts with a broadly drafted act
applying to all "dangerous instrumentalities" but leaving the ultimate
scope of its application to the judicial determination of what constitutes a dangerous instrumentality. It is doubtful, however, that
the legislature, if once moved to action, would leave such broad discretion to the courts.
Finally the legislature might adopt a general comparative negligence statute that would substitute a system of apportionment of
damages for the "all or nothing" rule of contributory negligence. A
14
statute similar to the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute,
barring recovery to a plaintiff whose fault is equal to or greater than
that of the defendant, would eliminate the "pure" comparative negligence feature that was the major objection to the statute passed by
the 1943 legislature. 15 It is possible that the existence of section
768.06 as a kind of compromise removing a large segment of the negligence field from the operation of the contributory negligence rule has
contributed to the inertia impeding the enactment of a general com11. Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 102 Fla. 1105, 137 So. 163 (1931).
12. FLA. S. JOUR. 717 (1943).
13. Ibid.
14. Wis. STAT. ANN. §331.045 (1958).
15. FLA. S. JOUR. 717 (1943). But see Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative
Negligence, 1941 WIs. L. REv. 289, 304, criticizing the limitation as illogical and
unfair.
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